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KENTucKY LAw JouBNAL
ADm INSRTrE LAw-SELE=CVE SERvicE-SurBREm CoURT RuLEs SE-
LECTIVE SmivicE SYSTEM'S D LINQUENCY BEGULATIONS NOT CONGRms-
sioNALLY AuTriiOmmz.-David Earl Gutknecht, after duly registering
with his local selective service board a few days subsequent to his
eighteenth birthday, was initially classified 1-A.1 Gutknecht later
entered college, and therefore received a 11-S deferment.2 Upon
leaving school he notified his local board by letter, although prior to
this time Gutknecht had filed an application for exemption as a
conscientious objector. This application was denied, but Gutkmecht
noted his appeal.
On October 16, 1967, as part of a nation-wide protest against
United States involvement in Vietnam, Gutknecht left his registration
certificate and his notice of classification on the steps of the Federal
Building in Minneapolis with a statement explaining the basis of his
protest. On November 22, 1967, Gutknecht's conscientious objector
appeal was denied, and five days later he received notice of his reclassi-
fication to I-A. He was declared delinquent3 and was ordered to
report for induction4 on January 24, 1968. Gutknecht did report, but
he signed a statement to the effect that he refused to take part in any
or all of the prescribed processing.
Consequently indicted for wilfully and knowingly failing and
neglecting "to perform a duty required of him" under the Selective
Service Act of 1967,5 Gutknecht was tried without a jury, found guilty,
and sentenced to four years imprisonment.6 A federal court of appeals
affirmed the conviction,7 holding in accord with O'Brien v. United
1 Under 32 C.F.R. § 1622.10 (1962) a 1-A classification is reserved for those
who are not otherwise deferred or exempt and who meet all the requirements for
immediate induction into the service.
2 32 C.F.R. § 1622.25 (Supp. 1966) provides for the temporary deferment of
students.
332 C.F.R. § 1642.4 (1962) allows a local board to declare a registrant
to be a "delinquent" whenever he "has failed to perform any duty or duties
required of him under the selective service law other than the duty to comply
with an Order to Report for Induction (SSS Form No. 252) or the duty to
comply with an Order to Report for Civilian Work and Statement of Employer
(SSS Form No. 153)." Guttmecht was declared a delinquent for failing to have
his registration certificate (SSS Form No. 2) and his current classification notice
(SSS Form No. 110) in his personal possession at all times, as required by 32
C.F.R. § 1617.1 (1962) and 32 C.F.R. § 1623.5 (1967) respectively.
4At the time Gutlmecht was declared delinquent the order of call was set
out in six categories in 32 C.F.R. § 1632.7 (1962). According to this provision
delinquents were to be inducted first, even ahead of volunteers. Therefore, when
he was declared delinquent, Gutknecht was moved from the third to the first
category, thus speeding up his induction.5 Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C.A. App. §§ 451.473 (1967).
6 United States v. Gutknecht, 283 F. Supp. 945 (D. Minn. 1968).
7406 F.2d 494 (8th Cir. 1969).
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States" that Gutkmecht's surrender of his draft card was not protected
by the first amendment, that the accelerated induction as a delinquent
was not "lawless or irregular," and that the facts alleged in the
indictment had been proved. The Supreme Court of the United States
then granted certiorari. 9 Held Reversed. The administratively pro-
mulgated delinquency regulations of the Selective Service System are
not authorized by Congress, and therefore can not be used to speed
up petitioner's induction into the armed services. Gutknecht v. United
States, - U.S. -, 90 S. Ct. 506 (1970).
Under the 1917 Selective Service Act 10 every male between the
ages of 21 and 80 was required to fill out a registration form. If one
failed to do so, his name was forwarded to the Army, which sub-
sequently sent him his draft notice." A person failing to report was
court-martialed as a deserter. 12 Thus the enforcement of the draft
laws was initially left principally to the military, with local boards and
civilian prosecutorial officials playing a reporting and policing role.
13
The Selective Training and Service Act of 194014 put the duty for
enforcing compliance with the new conscription statute and for pun-
ishing those who declined to report for or submit to induction within
the jurisdiction of the civil courts.15 Therefore one was no longer sub-
ject to military jurisdiction on the date he was ordered to report, but
could appeal to the courts up to the time he was actually inducted.
The regulations issued pursuant to the 1940 Act were the first to
mention the term "delinquent."16 Under these regulations a local
board's determination of whether or not a delinquent's "intent" was
wilful was the primary administrative decision involved in determining
whether to invoke the criminal process.' 7 In 1943, the regulations
were altered radically and the definition of a delinquent was changed
to mean "anyone liable for training and service who does not perform
any duty required of him."18 A delinquent nonregistrant could be
brought before the board, registered, and classified in a class available
8391 U.S. 367 (1968). In O'Bfien the Court ruled that draft card burning
was symbolic speech, but that the government's interest in maintaining an
efficient draft system outweighed the free speech interest.
9394 U.S. 997 (1969).
'o Selective Draft Act of 1917 ch. 15, 40 Stat. 76.
11 United States ex rel. Bergdofl v. Drum, 107 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1939).
12 Id.
'
3 Brief for Petitioner at 19, Gutknecht v. United States, - U.S. -, 90 S.
Ct. 506 (1970).
34 Act of Sept. 16, 1940, ch. 720, 54 Stat. 885.
15 Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U.S. 542 (1944).
16 32 C.F.R. §§ 642.1-642.8 (Supp. 1940).
'7 Id. § 642.3.
1832 C.F.R. § 601.5 (Supp. 1943).
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for service.19 Also, these regulations empowered a board to reclassify
as available for service any registrant who failed to perform a duty
required under the draft law and regulations, and to induct him as
soon as possible without regard to the order of call established else-
where in the regulations. 20 Again, a major consideration in the board's
action was whether a person had knowingly become a delinquent. If
so, he was to be retained in a class available for service; if not, he was
to be classified in the usual manner after an appeal, and his delinquency
was to be disregarded.21
The Selective Service Act of 194822 contained no reference to
delinquency or delinquents, but the regulations continued to survive
virtually intact. Not until the passage of the Selective Service Act of
1967 did Congress actually mention "delinquents," but this reference
concerns only the order-of-call provision which institutes a call by
age groups "after delinquents and volunteers."23 The precise provision
has never been used.
Then on October 24, 1967, General Lewis B. Hershey, Director of
the Selective Service System, issued Local Board Memorandum No.
85 and on October 26, 1967, a letter, the gist of which was that local
boards should use the delinquency regulations to reclassify and/or
speed up the inductions of those who had surrendered or mutilated
their draft cards or who had engaged in such other activities thought
to be "disruptive of the Selective Service System or not in the national
interest."24
Thus, as characterized by the petitioner Gutknecht in his brief
to the Supreme Court in the instant case,
... [T]he history of the delinquency provisions shows an evolution
by administrative regulatory fiat away from a simple reporting
system, through a standardized coercive mechanism giving a local
board quite limited discretion, to today's utterly standardless
system subject only to occasional administrative or judicial cor-
rection.25
Petitioner, therefore contended that the authority of the Selective
19 32 C.F.R. § 622.51 (Supp. 1943).
2032 C.F.R. § 642.13(a) (Supp. 1943).
2132 C.F.R. § 642.14(c) (Supp. 1943).2 2 Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 625, 62 Stat. 604.2 3 Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 456(h) (1)
(1967).
24For a discussion of the justiciability of the legality of the "Hershey directive"




Service System concerning the use of the delinquency regulations
has snow-balled through the years to a point where today it has
arrogated extensive power and discretion to itself without congressional
mandate.
The Court earlier had denied enforcement of the delinquency
regulations, without facing the question of their validity, in Oestereich
v. Selective Service System Local Board No. 11.26 In that case, the
Court ruled that a divinity student with a statutory exemption who
had turned in his registration certificate and was consequently de-
clared delinquent and reclassified I-A could not be deprived of his
draft status for conduct not related to the merits of his exemption.
In the instant case, however, Gutknecht was already classified I-A,
having no statutory exemption or deferment, and thus the Court had
to either follow the concurring view of Mr. Justice Stewart that the
local board had violated the very regulations it claimed to be en-
forcing27 or meet the validity of the delinquency regulations head on.
Choosing to do the latter, the majority of the Court in Gutknecht
reasoned that Congress, rather than authorizing the reclassification of
exempt and deferred registrants for punitive purposes and providing
for the accelerated induction of delinquents, had merely reaffirmed
its intention under § 12 of the 1967 Act to punish delinquents through
the criminal law. Thus, the majority ruled that the delinquency
regulations lacked congressional authorization and struck them down,
despite the strong argument of the government that Congress, by its
mention of delinquents in the 1967 Act, had taken notice of delinquency
regulations and had authorized them by reenacting the draft laws
without overruling any delinquency provision.2 8 The statutory refer-
ence being that delinquents are to be the first inductees, it can be
powerfully argued that Congress was aware of the impact, as well as
merely the existence, of the regulations. However, the majority
termed this a "passing reference" when measured against explicit
congressional provision for criminal punishment of those who violate
the draft laws,2 9 congressional provision for exemptions and defer-
26393 U.S. 233 (1968).2 7 Gutknecht v. United States, - U.S. -, -, 90 S. Ct. 506, 515 (1970). In
his concurring opinion Mr. Justice Stewart did not reach the question of whether the
delinquency regulations were congressionally authorized, he being able to dispose
of the case on this even narrower ground.
28 Brief for Respondent at 33, Gutknecht v. United States, - U.S. -, 90 S.
Ct. 506 (1970).
29 Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 462 (1967).
This section specifically provides for a fine of $10,000 or a prison term for not
more than five years, or both, for a person convicted of a draft law violation.
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ments, 0 and congressional expressions concerning the desire for an
impartial order of call.31
Also, the Court concluded from reviewing legislative history for a
complete view of congressional intent that the great concern of
Congress in the section in which the reference was made was with
the order of call and the selection of persons for military service in an
impartial manner, for in that year Congress struck out against the
grant of power to the President to initiate "a random system of
selection."32 The Court's reasoning was explained when Mr. Justice
Douglas said for the majority:
It is difficult to believe that with that show of resistance to the
grant of a more limited power, there was acquiescence in the
delegation of a broad, sweeping power to Selective Service to
discipline registrants through the delinquency device.33
Even though the random system for induction has since been put into
force by proclamation, pursuant to an act of Congress repealing the
provision requiring the President to select from the oldest first within
the designated prime age group for induction,3 4 legislative history,
according to the majority in Gutknecht, again points to the concern
of Congress with the problems of the order of induction. 35
Summarizing its reasoning, the Court said:
The power under the regulations to declare a registrant delinquent
has no statutory standard or even guidelines. The power is
exercised entirely at the discretion of the local board. It is a
broad roving authority, a type of administrative absolutism not
congenial to our law-making traditions .... We search the Act
in vain for any clues that Congress desired the Act to have punitive
sanctions apart from the criminal prosecutions specifically author-
3o Id. § 456. This section sets out in detail all circumstances under which a
registrant may be exempted or deferred from service in the armed forces.31 Id. § 455. This provision specifically requires that "the selection of persons
for training and service .. .be made in an impartial manner .... " It further
provides that there be no discrimination on account of race or color, that no
person under the age of nineteen shall be called unless there are not a sufficient
number of persons available for induction within the jurisdiction of the local
board, that the President cannot change the method of determining the relative
order of induction for registrants within each age group unless authorized by law(now repealed; see note 34 infra, and accompanying text), and that an impartial
quota system be established.
3 2 H.R. REP'. No. 346, 90th Gong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1967).
83 Gutknecht v. United States, - U.S. -- , 90 S. Ct. 506, 511 (1970).
84 Terepeal of this provision of the Miliary Selective Service Act of 1967,
50 U.S.C.A. App. § 455( a) (2) (1967), by an Act of Nov. 26, 1969, Pub. L. No.
91-124, 83 Stat. 220, enabled President Nixon to issue Proclamation 3945, 34 Fed.
Reg. 19017 (Nov. 29, 1969), putting a random system for induction into effect.
35 Gutknecht v. United States, - U.S. -, -, 90 S. Ct. 506, 511 (1970).
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ized. Nor do we read it as granting personal privileges which
may be forfeited for transgressions which affront the local
board.8 6
The decision in Gutknecht is a definite blow to the Selective Service
System and its self-styled "speedy and efficient operation." Despite
repeated avowals by officials that the purpose of the delinquency
regulations was to bring reluctant registrants into compliance with
the draft regulations and thus supply young men for military service
and not for criminal prosecutions, the effective result of the use of
the delinquency regulations was to stifle dissent-meaningful, unlawful,
or otherwise. The Supreme Court by declaring the regulations
unauthorized has now forced the use of criminal prosecutions for
violations of the draft laws and regulations.
While the draft process has certain unique problems, it still should
provide, wherever possible, the same procedural safeguards
deemed necessary in other areas of the administrative process. It
is no answer to say that all have a military obligation, and thus
errors in classification are of little consequence. The draft process
is still a creature of law, and Congress-through the act and by
delegating authority to the Selective Service to promulgate regu-
lations not inconsistent with it-has provided that certain situa-
tions must be treated in certain ways. It is the responsibility of
the courts to control the process through which this is accom-
plished.37 (Emphasis added.)
A possible consequence of the Gutknecht decision may be the
specific authorization by Congress of new delinquency regulations.
Then the Court would be unable to follow, as it did in Gutknecht, its
old accepted tenet of disposing of cases, if possible, before reaching
constitutional questions.3 8 One issue that would then arise would be
the issue of symbolic speech in such delinquent acts as disposing of
one's draft card. The Court would seemingly follow the O'Brien
decision, however, and rule that the legitimate interest of the govern-
ment in the need for the orderly administration of the raising of an
86 Id.
87 Note, Fairness and Due Process Under the Selective Service System, 114
U. PA. L. REv. 1014, 1048 (1966).38 Mr. Justice Harlans view was more narrow than the majority opinion in
Gut knecht. He stated in his concurring opinion that he saw nothing wrong with
classifying as I-A a registrant who failed to provide his local board with informa-
tion pertinent to whether or not he qualified for a deferment or exemption. Thus,
as he saw it, existing legislation does not authorize accelerated induction to punish
past infractions but "it may well authorize acceleration to encourage a registrant
to bring himseff into compliance with the rules essential to the operation of the




army outweigh the first amendment argument that the returning of
draft cards is a protected vehicle of speech.3 9
Furthermore if statutorily authorized regulations are eventually
formulated, they will have to be sufficiently narrow in scope and
clear in meaning so as to set up standards by which the legality of a
"delinquency" declaration can be judged. "And the regulations, when
written, would be subject to the customary inquiries as to infirmities
on their face or in their applications . . . "40 Thus, even regulations
sanctioned by Congress would probably be challenged on the ground
that they had a punitive effect on the exercise of constitutional rights.
No matter what the future holds, the Gutknecht decision repre-
sents a triumph over an overbroad, discretionary administrative power
-a vindictive sort of power used to silence those who would dare to
confront the System.
[Thus] courts are beginning to evidence a belief that the current
administrative procedure of the System is inadequate to guarantee
full protection of all those affected by it. The issue will no longer
be settled by urging the courts to respect the sanctity of the
Selective Service; constitutional questions have superseded more
administrative considerations . . . . [I]f Congress fails to fill the
gap in the statutory structure, the courts will undoubtedly con-
tinue to assume an innovative role in an effort to prevent adiminis-
trative abuse, by the Selective Service and others, of basic con-
stitutional liberties. 41
I Gary Bale
AD mSAvE LAw-JunicLr BE~viEw-DuE Paocss.-Susan Holinke
was arrested and indicted on July 22, 1966 for the unlawful possession
of lysergic acid diethalamide [hereinafter LSD], classified in Ken-
tucky as a narcotic drug' by a regulation promulgated by the State
39 Accord, United States v. Kime, 188 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1951), United
States v. Hertlein, 143 F. Supp. 742 (E.D. Wis. 1956). In these lower federal court
cases the legality of the regulations forbidding nonpossession of draft cards was
upheld.
40 Gutlmecht v. United States, - U.S.-, -, 90 S. Ct. 506, 512 (1970).
41Jones, Draft Reclassification for Political Demonstrators-Jurisdictional
Amount in Suits Against Federal Officers, 53 CoRnEL L. txv. 916, 934 (1968).
1 The unlawful possession of a narcotic drug is prohibited in Ky. R v. STAT.
[hereinafter cited as KS] § 218.020 (1936).
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